Part one of Husserl’s Ideas II is given over to the phenomenological “constitution of material nature.” Of all places, it’s here that Husserl speculates about God and spirits as embodied, about the objectivity of a world saturated by subjectivity (95, 90). In this speculative exercise, slightly tongue in cheek, Husserl toys with the notion that this could include God and spirits entering into the world as possible appearances in consciousness (91). The key words to what I would call “phenomenological theology,” as it were, are “possibility,” “appearance,” “seeing,” “things,” “mutual understanding,” “the other,” “body.”
Of course, God enjoys no ontological status in these speculations. Why not and why should one demand otherwise, either from Husserl or from philosophy in general?
In a section devoted to “More precise characteristics of the physicalist thing,” Husserl insists that we cannot attribute actuality to any appearing thing in and of itself. It’s “out of the question” since the appearance of sense qualities is unstable, depending on the disposition of the sense organ.
But what about God, Husserl begins to speculate, what about the way in which things might appear to God?
(What follows below are taken from pp.90-1).
 “Shall we say that God sees things as they are in themselves, while we see them through our sense organs, which are a kind of distorting eyeglasses?”
 “But should the things which appear to us be the same as the things which appear to God as they appear to God, then a unity of mutual understanding would have to be possible between God and us, just as, between different men, only through mutual understanding is there the possibility of knowing that the things seen by the one are the same as those seen by the other.”
 But how would the identification be thinkable if not in the sense that the supposed absolute spirit sees the things precisely also through sensuous appearances, which, likewise, have to be exchangeable in an understanding that is reciprocal…as is the case with appearances we share among us men?”
The CONCLUSION, drawn by Husserl: “Obviously, the absolute spirit would have to have a Body (Leib) for there to be mutual understanding, and thus the dependency on sense organs would have to be there as well.” Nature is understood to be an intersubjective nexus-reality for everyone who “can have dealings with us. This means that, “There is always the possibility that new spirits enter into this nexus; but they do so by means of their Bodies, which are represented through possible appearance in our consciousness and through corresponding ones in theirs.”
(Note, the word Leib is used by Husserl to denote the lived, living animate body. Körper is the word denoting the inanimate, physical body. It’s a distinction that bears the trace of vitalism and Lebensphilosophie in Husserl’s thought).
My own takeaway is that the kind of theological speculation here flies in the face of any kind of theology, rationalist or other, that would insist on God’s absolute alterity, or asks us to think in a more radical way the thought of non-differentiation (about that, more tomorrow in relation to Heidegger). It’s focus on sensation would draw Jewish theology away from Maimonides, Cohen, and Levinas towards (certain readings of) Buber and Rosenzweig. But unlike, Buber and Rosenzweig, it is more tongue in cheek. The idea of God’s thought disappears as soon as it appears in “the constitution of material nature.”